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Solipsism and Self-Reference 
! 
I. Introduction 
In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems 
we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion 
will centre on Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. In that work Wittgenstein can be seen to express an unusually 
profound understanding of the problems faced in trying to give an account of how we, 
who are subjects, identify ourselves as objects in the world. We have in his 
compressed remarks, the kernels of a number of arguments which all come together to 
form what can be called the problem of self-identification. I want to argue that the 
solipsism of the Tractatus arises at least in part as a solution to, or – to put it less 
optimistically – as a symptom or articulation of this problem. 
 In approaching Wittgenstein’s early discussion of solipsism in this way I will 
obviously be in disagreement with some other interpretations of the work. For 
example, there are those who think that there is no ‘solipsism of the Tractatus’.1 In 
fact, the Tractarian arguments presented below as motivating solipsism have been 
seen as fulfilling the quite opposite function of refuting it. I do not intend in this piece 
to engage with alternative interpretations. Let me say a little bit about why I have 
granted myself the licence not to do so. First, the focus of my concern with solipsism 
is on how it connects with what I have called the problem of self-identification. While 
it is a concern that emerged in an attempt to make sense of Wittgenstein’s remarks in 
the Tractatus, if it turns out that there has been a distortion of Wittgenstein’s thought, 
then so be it. The hope is that there has nevertheless been salvaged a line of thinking 
that is of interest. Connected to this is the fact that it would be something of a mis-
description to say that what is being attempted here is a true interpretation of 
Wittgenstein. I am content – as can seem almost inevitable when confronting 
Wittgenstein’s work – to use it and explore it rather than interpret it. 
 Second, Wittgenstein claims that anyone who understands what he has said 
will recognize his remarks as senseless. As the materials we use to come to such a 
recognition of senselessness must come from the work itself we can – with a straight 
face – take Wittgenstein to be refuting the very doctrine that we would, if ignoring the 
recognition of senselessness, take him to be advocating. But we must be wary of 
letting our doubts about the credibility (or even respectability) of solipsistic claims 
lead us to take his protestations of senselessness to count as part of a refutation of 
solipsism but not, equally, as part of a refutation of, for example, the presuppositional 
status of logic. Thus whilst of course it may be that, within the bracket of 
senselessness, we have a refutation of one but not the other, it is a justified starting 
point to see whether we cannot find in the Tractatus material that seems to force us 
towards solipsistic claims. 
 
II. An Argument for Solipsism. 
What is one to say if one thinks that there must be a place for the self, for a 
representing subject, and yet cannot explain how we could represent that subject if it 
were within the world. If one also holds that it cannot be outside the world – since 
nothing can – one is going to struggle to say something like: Well, then it must 
somehow be of the world if not in it, it must be a limit or a condition of the world. We 
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have here a form of  argument for solipsism of the kind suggested by Wittgenstein. 
Let me try to fill it out:2
1. Everything in the world can be represented. 
‘Propositions can represent the whole of reality.’ (4.12) 
‘The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and 
adding which of them are true and which are false.’ (4.26) 
‘Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes 
itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.’ (5.5561) 
 
2. That there is a representing self is a precondition of (the possibility of) 
representation. 
‘To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to 
one another in such and such a way.’ (5.5423) 
‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.’ (5.6) 
‘The world is my world.’ (5.62) 
 
3. The world is (must be) represented. 
‘The world is my world.’ (5.62) 
 
Therefore: 
 
4. There is (must be) a representing self. (2&3) 
‘What brings the self into philosophy is that fact that “the world is my 
world”.’(5.641) 
 
 
5. The self cannot be represented. 
‘If I wrote a book called The World as I found it...[the subject] alone could not 
be mentioned in that book.—’ (5.63) 
‘Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?’ (5.633) 
 
Therefore: 
 
6. The self is not in the world. (1&5) 
‘This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc.- as it 
is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.’ (5. 5421) 
‘There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.’ (5.631) 
‘The subject does not belong to the world.’ (5.632) 
 
7. There can be nothing outside the world.  
‘So we cannot say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this, but not that”.’ 
(5.61) 
 
[8. Even if there were something outside the world, the world could be nothing to 
it.  
 ‘If there would be a logic, even if there were no world, how then could there 
be a logic given that there is a world.’ (5.5521)] 
 3
 
Therefore: 
 
9. The self is not outside the world. (4&7) 
 
10. The self does not belong within the world but is a limit of it, or coincides with 
it in its entirety. (4,6 & 9)3
‘I am my world.’ (5.63) 
‘The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.’ 
(5.632) 
 
 
III. Tractarian Substantiation 
1. Exclusion of the self from within the world. 
It seems to me that in considering the above argument the most important claim to 
focus on is the assumption that the self cannot be represented. It is clearly 
contentious. Only the propositions that the self is not in the world and that the self is a 
limit of the world are more problematic; but they stand as conclusions which rest 
upon the assumption of the non-representability of the self. So not only is that 
assumption contentious, it is also pivotal. It is my view that the considerations which 
Wittgenstein brings to bear in favour of this assumption bear the weight of the 
resulting solipsistic conclusions. It is in this way that we arrive at solipsism as a result 
of coming to appreciate the depth of the problems we face in giving an account of 
self-representation or self-reference. It was, the suggestion is, the fact that 
Wittgenstein was unable to see how we could, given these problems, avoid 
concluding that we cannot represent or refer to ourselves, that led him to equate self 
and world. 
 In considering the above argument we might think that we should focus not on 
the non-representability assumption but rather on the opening assumption of the 
argument. We might think that it is this assumption that bears the main responsibility 
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for the solipistic conclusion. So before going on to present the arguments I take 
Wittgenstein to have identified for the non-representability assumption, it is as well to 
make clear why the opening assumption should not be the primary focus of our 
concern. First, we do not really need the universal assumption that everything is 
representable to reach our conclusion. All we need is the weaker assumption that were 
the self in the world it would be representable. The Kantian thought of self-
consciousness as essential to selfhood would give us this straight away. Second, and 
more interesting, what would lead us to concentrate our consideration of the argument 
on its first premise would most likely be the thought that the premise embodied an 
idealist assumption.4 If we could show that the first premise was idealist, we would 
straight away reduce the power of the argument and thus reduce the status of the 
solipsistic conclusion. If all we had here was an argument from idealism to solipsism 
it would not perhaps overly excite us. It is the possibility of something like a 
transcendental argument for solipsism which seems both worrying and enticing. 
However, prima facie, there nothing obviously idealist about the claim that 
everything can be represented. It seems to be a shared assumption of early analytical 
philosophers that reality was intrinsically representable: in all its objective and mind 
independent glory it lay ready to be described. It need be no more an idealist 
assumption than that made by modern naturalists that there could be a complete 
science that we could understand and which describes and explains the whole world 
and its happenings. (Of course, if one takes scientific theories to be conjunctions of 
propositions the former view collapses into the latter.) The point is that one can 
remain a realist about the world to the extent that that means taking the world to be 
ontologically mind-independent, whilst holding certain assumptions of a harmony 
between the nature of the world and our capacities for representing it, which lead us 
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to assume that the world is thoroughly representable. To assume otherwise would be 
to assume that a degree of scepticism is a necessary concomitant of realism. Perhaps 
one way to construe the representability assumption that makes it obviously 
consistent with realism is to understand it not so much as claiming that we will in fact 
be able to come to understand everything but as claiming that nothing can be a priori 
non-representable. One does not need to think that the world necessarily outstrips our 
grasp in order to be a realist. Indeed to the extent that we were committed to such 
necessities we may seem to have given up precisely the advantage in lack of 
metaphysical baggage that the realist can seem to have over the idealist.5 The above 
remarks are not of course sufficient to rule out the possibility of there being an 
argument to the effect that assumptions of harmony between world and representing 
subject do in fact already presuppose idealist commitments and that some scepticism 
is a necessary concomitant of realism. The point for now is that the representability 
assumption seems prima facie not to contradict realist intuitions and thus leaves us 
with what promises to be a really interesting argument, rather than merely a move 
from idealism to solipsism. 
 Having decided to concentrate on step (5) of the above argument let me now 
turn to ask why anyone would think that the self is non-representable. Wittgenstein 
provides us with the material from which we can identify and develop at least four 
distinct, though obviously connected and not independent arguments, for that claim. 
 
Argument from Psychological Ascriptions: Wittgenstein’s discussion of the self starts 
with his analysis of propositions of psychological attribution, that is, with 
propositions  of the form ‘A F’s that p’ where F is a psychological predicate. His 
discussion of such forms takes place in the remarks (5.541 – 5.5423) that stand as 
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elucidations of 5.54. Remark 5.54 is a claim of the truth functionality of propositional 
form. It says: 
5.54  In the general propositional form propositions occur in other 
propositions only as bases of truth operations. 
 
Such psychological reports are obviously of interest because they stand as seeming 
counter-examples to the truth functionality claim made by 5.54. This is what leads 
Wittgenstein to consider them. But they are also of interest because their proper 
analysis results in an argument the conclusion of which is that there is ‘no such thing 
as the soul – subject etc. – as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the 
present day’. By this Wittgenstein seems to mean that there is no subject in the world 
that is the subject of psychological states. Wittgenstein says: 
5.541  At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to 
occur in another in a different way. 
Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 
‘A believes that p is the case’ or ‘A has the thought p’, etc. 
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p 
stood in some kind of relation to an object A. 
(And in modern epistemology (Russell, Moore, etc.) those propositions 
have actually been construed in this way.) 
 
5.542  It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, ‘A 
says p’, are of the form ‘“p” says p’: and this does not involve a 
correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts 
by means of the correlation of their objects. 
 
Wittgenstein, I suggest, starts with the thought that psychological reports of this kind 
report that A represents p in some way. And his adherence to the picture theory leads 
him to conclude that p is represented by ‘p’ where ‘p’ is taken to be a propositional 
sign that is as complex as the fact that can be represented by it. Thus if such 
psychological reports are reporting a fact in A which represents the fact that p, they 
are properly analysed as being of the form ‘“p” says that p’. The thinking here 
demands that the propositional states of a subject be representations in some sense. If 
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we accept this we are led to the conclusion that A must be as complex as each fact 
which A represents and as complex as all the facts which A represents. (A vivid way 
to bring out this point may be to consider it in terms of Fodor’s language of thought. 
If having a propositional attitude involves tokening a complex structure – which 
realizes a sentence in the language of thought for example – then the subject must be 
at least as complex as that structure.) But from this demand for complexity 
Wittgenstein concludes: 
5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul – the subject etc. 
– as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. 
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul. 
Now why should this be so? Why cannot the subject or soul be just as complex as all 
its thoughts – why cannot it be precisely a composite of those structures which 
represent the propositions it believes, thinks etc.? One thing that Wittgenstein surely 
means to bring out is the fact that unless the component parts are accessible to one 
subject then there is no sense in which we have a psychological state. If a group of 
people were each given a piece of paper with one word on it, then even if all the 
words together could be taken to form a sentence there is no sense in which a 
proposition is being understood.6 The ascription of mental states goes hand in hand 
with some supposition of a unity of consciousness. That is, with a unified first person 
standpoint. Similarly, we need to bind not only the elements of one mental state 
together, but also different mental states, if they are to be attributable to the same 
experiencing subject.  
 However it is still not clear why these demands for unity are taken to rule out 
complexity. Is it not open to us to give an account of the subject of psychological 
states as having component parts combined together to form a unity which allows it to 
be both a representer of propositions as well as unified experiencing subject? Yet 
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Wittgenstein’s thought seems to be that whatever is required for a subject to have the 
requisite complex structure is going to contradict the supposed unity and vice versa. It 
is not just that some third personal principle of composition or combination is 
required to unify the complex of representations and so make the representing subject 
a subject; the requirement is that the complex be unified from a first person 
standpoint. Wittgenstein takes it that in order for that to be the case the standpoint can 
be treated neither as comprised of the complexity, nor as merely another element of it 
– neither option would solve the problem. It is the need to postulate, if meaning is to 
be possible, a first personal standpoint or point of view that is distinct from, but has 
access to the complex of representations that results in the claim that a composite soul 
would no longer be a soul. The prior first person standpoint, and not the complex of 
representations, will then come to be seen as the true subject. 7
 The above line of thought suggests a way in which one might be led from the 
consideration of psychological reports to the sceptical conclusion about the subject. 
Furthermore, the explanations suggested above of both 5.542 and 5.5421 are 
supported by Wittgenstein’s remark at 5.5423. This remark closes his discussion of 
psychological reports and the startling conclusions that result from their analysis. He 
says:  
5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are 
related to one another in such and such a way.  
This no doubt explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the 
figure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different 
facts. 
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(If I look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at 
the b’s, then the a’s appear to be in front, and vice versa.) 
 
This remark is revealing in a number of ways. Were I to be rash, I would claim that it 
is pivotal to understanding Wittgenstein’s position on the self both in his remarks at 
the 5.54s and in his later remarks in the 5.6s. It is clear that we are presented here 
with a model of what is involved in representation in general. As in his later and more 
often discussed remarks (for example, 5.633  ‘You will say that this is exactly like the 
case of the eye and the visual field...’) Wittgenstein illustrates his model of the 
relationship between a subject and the world it represents by appeal to visual 
perception. The remark also fits well with the explanation just provided. In order to 
perceive a complex represented by p there needs to be a point of view – in this case a 
visual point of view which assembles the parts into a unified representation. That 
what we have is an assembling and not merely a reflection can be seen by the 
possibility of an aspect shift – first taking it one way then another. However, this 
remark also leads us a bit further. The remark does not only indicate the need for a 
distinct first personal viewpoint from which understanding can occur, a view point 
from which a complex can be taken to be a unity by the apprehension of the relations 
between its constituents, it also has direct consequences for the representability of the 
subject. The rationale for the supposition that the first person viewpoint must be 
distinct from and independent of the complex of our representing states rather than 
constituted in some way out of them only really becomes clear when we consider the 
case of self-representation. Let me try to bring this out. 
 Suppose that there could be a complex self, then the only self to be 
encountered in experience would be complex enough to sustain thoughts, perceptions 
and so on. But according to the model given, perception, and therefore representation, 
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of that self by the self would require that the various elements of the complex be 
taken as related thus and so. However, that necessitates a distinct first person view 
point from which the constituents of the complex are taken as related thus and so. 
Therefore, the self must be complex in order to represent the world, but a complex 
self could not represent itself. 
 In the argument derived from these remarks we see, I think, the core of the 
reasoning behind the claim that the self cannot be represented, which in turn 
precludes the self from the world. However, let me now move on to identify a second 
argument that the Tractatus seems to present us with. This argument has in fact 
largely been covered in the preceding discussion. 
 
Argument from Non-Observability: Wittgenstein like others before him was struck by 
the fact that the subject of experience is not to be met with in experience: 
5.633   Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? 
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual 
field. But really you do not see the eye [My italics]. 
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an 
eye.  
 
There are a number of ways in which we can take the remarks on the unobservability 
of the subject. Given the analogy already indicated between visual perception and 
representation in general, we can take such remarks as expressing a conclusion to the 
effect that the subject is not only non-observable but also non-representable. And we 
would be justified in doing so. However, it seems to me that Wittgenstein’s remarks 
indicating the non-observability of the self stand not just to provide a statement of the 
view that the self is non-representable but also to give us reasons for such a view. We 
can take the remarks to be doing this in two ways. First, one of the central ways in 
which we are able to come to represent objects in the world is via our perception of 
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them. If we are unable – in fact and in principle – to perceive ourselves we are then 
blocked from explaining the possibility of self-representation by appealing to our 
senses. Second, the remarks about perception can be taken to apply not just to 
external perception but also to any supposed quasi-perceptual introspective capacity. 
So, we can appeal to neither an introspective nor an ‘extrospective’ acquaintance with 
ourselves in order to underwrite self-representation. We have, therefore, reasons for 
being sceptical of the possibility of self-representation that flow from the non-
observability of the self. Now to the third argument.  
 
Argument from Contingency: Directly after the remarks just quoted we can find a 
more general argument as to why experience could not furnish us with a 
representation of the self – either directly or indirectly. Following 5.633, quoted 
above, he says: 
5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this: 
 
 
And he goes on: 
5.634   This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the 
same time a priori. 
Whatever we see could be other than it is. 
Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. 
There is no a priori order of things. 
 
What if we were to come to know and represent the self by experiencing it, or 
observing it? What if the visual field did have a form like that? One thing that it 
would mean was that there was an element of our experience that was ever present – 
we could not sometimes experience the world without the self being present and at 
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other times with it.8 Indeed, there being a subject of experience is taken as a 
precondition of all experience; knowledge that there is a subject of experience is not 
furnished by this or that experience. In this sense it is a priori. If, therefore, the 
subject were such as to be known through experience – it would be an a priori 
element of what is experienced. Similarly if the subject were inferred from what is 
seen or experienced directly then the subject would be always inferable from what is 
experienced directly and would be in the same way a priori. Also if the subject could 
always be inferred, as it would have to be if it was known through inference at all 
there would have always to be parts or aspects of experience which legitimated that 
inference. Those parts or aspects of experience would also have to be a priori. 
Further, Wittgenstein clearly holds that the above claims to a prioricity would 
contradict the contingency of what we experience directly and of what we describe. 
So, in brief, the argument from contingency that I take to be presented is as follows:  
1. Everything known to us via experience is contingent. 
2. If we knew the self through experience it would be a priori. 
3. If anything is an a priori part of experience then it cannot be a contingent 
part of what is experienced. 
4. If the self is known through experience then it cannot be a contingent part 
of what is experienced. 
5. Therefore the self is not known through experience. 
In looking for the rationale behind the third assumption – the claim that excludes a 
self known a priori from being a contingent part of experience – we need not conclude 
that Wittgenstein relies here on any simple assumption of the mutual entailment of a 
prioricity and necessity. Rather the central linking thought seems to be that what we 
experience can be contingent only if we could experience things differently. It is this 
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that closes off the possibility of the a priori being a contingent part of experience. 
Thus, the argument for the third assumption can be taken to be as follows: 
1. If everything we experience is contingent then everything we experience 
could be experienced as being other than it is. 
2. If there were anything which was an a priori part of experience then we 
could not experience things as being other than they are in a way which did 
not include that thing. 
3. If anything is an a priori part of experience then it cannot be a contingent 
part of what is experienced. 
I have concentrated above on the general form of the argument from contingency.9 
However, I take Wittgenstein in 5.634 also to be presenting more specific arguments 
against the possibility of the self being identified by acquaintance (i.e. perceptually) 
on the one hand or by description on the other. Everything we are acquainted with is 
such that we might not have been, and everything we can describe could have been 
otherwise.10
 Let me now move on to a fourth argument for the non-identifiability or 
representability of the self. I will call it the argument from externality. 
 
Argument from Externality: Some versions of an argument from externality appear 
very often in discussions that try to give us a sense of the necessary elusiveness of the 
self. It is in fact very hard to track down the backing for, and therefore the plausibility 
of such arguments, and I am not here going to do much more than gesture at their 
general form. The arguments I have in mind in talking about arguments from 
externality are those that conclude that the subject cannot be captured by the systems 
it has for identifying, representing and knowing its world, because the subject is in 
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some way external to the means that it has for identifying, representing and knowing 
its world. Its externality is very often thought to be the result of it being in some sense 
the source of those means. Thus Merleau-Ponty: 
I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of 
biological, psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself up 
within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my 
scientific knowledge is gained from my own point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be 
meaningless. (1962, p.viii). 
In Wittgenstein we can see, as many have noted, something like the same general 
reasoning. Wittgenstein has been taken to hold that a system of representation has to 
be understood from a point of view that cannot be captured in that system. Now this 
thought can be taken in two ways. First, and most simply, it can be taken as the 
conclusion resulting from the failure to explain the possibility of self-representation. 
But it can also be thought of as providing a further reason for the claim that the self is 
unrepresentable. That is, we can see the subject as excluded from the system of 
representation on the basis of a failure to explain its possible inclusion; however, we 
can also see the nature of representation and of the representing subject as such that 
the subject is bound to be external to that system of representation of which it is the 
representing point of view. It is my suspicion that this line of thought inherits much of 
its plausibility from a kind of argument by analogy. We will find almost unavoidable 
the thought that the subject is bound to lie beyond the means it has for representing its 
world if our general model of representation is construed in analogy with visual 
perception. If in order to identify anything we have need of a point of view from 
which identification takes place, then it will not be surprising if we cannot identify 
this point of view.11  
 We have seen above four overlapping, and interconnected, lines of thoughts 
which have been excavated without too much trouble from the remarks of the 
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Tractatus. It may be that the excavation has been such that, as Tractarian elements, 
some or all of what has been extracted has been damaged or distorted in the process. 
Nevertheless we seem to have in our hands a number of different lines of thought 
among which there is remarkable coherence and which all provide arguments which 
lead us to a conclusion of the non-representability of the self. Furthermore, these 
arguments clearly reflect deep and abiding problems we face in accounting for 
identification of the self by the self. In fact, together they seem to me to constitute the 
heart of the problem self-identification. Together with the assumption that if the self 
is in the world it is at least in principle representable, these arguments seem to lead us 
to the exclusion of the self from the world. 
 
2. Exclusion of the self from without the world 
Wittgenstein, by means of the above arguments seeks to show how the subject is 
excluded from being one of the objects that comprise the world. At the same time he 
is  resolute in his refusal to invent another world in which to house it.12 It is clear that 
he would  consider useless the attempt to fashion a subjective realm over and above 
the objective world from which the self has been excluded. Whether or not the subject 
is claimed as a physical object in an objective realm or, for example, a mental one in a 
subjective realm, the same problems of identification would emerge. Such a 
reduplication of worlds would serve only to reduplicate the problem. It is also clear 
that, for Wittgenstein, the self cannot be a transcendent object ‘outside’ the world. 
The subject cannot be ‘outside’ the world, because nothing can. The world is 
everything that is the case. So, as is said at 5.61, 
5.61 So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not 
that’. 
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We can also extract, from certain of Wittgenstein’s remarks on logic, a further reason 
for why the subject cannot be transcendent to the world but must be transcendental or 
liminal with respect to it.13 Only three remarks further on from his discussion of 
psychological reports, the discussion which ends with the comments on what it takes 
to perceive a complex, Wittgenstein says: 
5.552  The ‘experience’ that we need in order to understand logic is not that 
something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, 
however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience – that something is so. 
It is prior to the question ‘How?’, not prior to the question ‘What?’. 
 
5.5521 And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in 
this way: if there would be a logic, even if there were no world, how 
then could there be a logic, given that there is a world? 
 
Wittgenstein asks regarding logic, how we could think of logic as being independent 
of the world, as being transcendent to it. He concludes that were logic to be in this 
way autonomous or transcendent it could not be that we use logic in understanding 
the world we do understand. But logic just is that which conditions and applies to our 
world, that is, to the world. The independence of logic and the world would render 
them radically isolated, (and as radically isolated they would in fact lose their status 
as logic and world). These remarks are broadly applicable to the nature of the self. 
The self has been denied a place in the world. We must also deny it a place without 
the world. The self cannot be transcendent to or independent of the world; if the self 
were envisaged as transcendent to the world there could be no such self for us, it 
would be isolated from the world and unable to provide a first person view point 
needed to make sense of the world. In other words it could not be a self and the world 
could not be a world to a self independent of it. It is these thoughts which lead me to 
add (8) in the argument at the top of this piece. The thought captured in (8) shows the 
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futility of an  attempt – for example, by someone construing ‘world’ as merely 
empirical world – to place the self outside the world by denial of (7). 
 
3. The self as limit of the world. 
 The subject can neither be within the world nor without the world and yet it 
seems to be demanded by the possibility of representation. The obscure and infamous 
conclusion is that it is variously the limit of the world and the world itself. 
Wittgenstein does not provide much in the way of elucidating his solution. Indeed, as 
I have intimated, it can seem entirely wrong to conceive of it as a solution – it is 
rather as if given the negative moves there is just nothing else to say. The fact that 
that which can be said turns out to be obscure and mystifying, at worst absurd, merely 
adds to our sense of the problem. There is of course nothing in these remarks that 
Wittgenstein himself would not agree with. However, even supposing that in 
Wittgenstein’s solipsism we have a genuine solution to the problem of identification, 
I am not here going to attempt to flesh it out. I will rather confine myself to 
identifying one element that is to be found in the idea of the self as liminal. A clue to 
understanding this element lies in the above quoted remarks on logic. His comments 
on the nature of our ‘experience’ of logic can again be fruitfully applied to the self. 
We have seen that Wittgenstein is concerned to argue that we do not come to know 
the subject as part of any experience that something or other is the state of things. In 
particular we are not able to represent the subject by experiencing some part of the 
world to be thus and so, for as we have seen, we do not seem to be able to locate the 
subject in the world as one object among others, or experience the subject as we 
experience objects and states of affairs which are proper parts of the world, and nor is 
it inferred from things being thus and so. Rather the experience that we need to 
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understand the self is that something is, that the world is there for us. But that, 
Wittgenstein adds, is not an experience. It is certainly not an experience of the self 
and nor is it in any straightforward sense an experience of the world. We experience 
sectors of the world as being somehow, as being arranged in this way rather than that, 
so some sort of abstraction is required in order for us to experience that something is. 
Again the analogy with the visual field is useful. You do not experience the eye in the 
visual field and nothing in the visual field allows you to infer it is seen by an eye. 
Rather the experience that you need to experience or ‘see’ the eye is to ‘see’ that 
something is visually there for you – but that is not really to see anything. You do not 
see that there is a visual field – it is prior to every sighting. 
 For Wittgenstein, to experience something is to take some part of the world as 
being configured thus and so. And it being so configured is contingent. Thus the 
subject cannot be experienced as part of the world. In this remark on logic 
Wittgenstein suggests that there may nevertheless be a kind of apprehension, an 
apprehension not properly thought of as an experience, that the world is. That, 
however, is the same as the apprehension that the world is for me and thus suggests a 
way of apprehending the self by apprehending the world. 
 I have now completed my account of what I see in Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
the self. I take the remarks to be compelling, extremely rich in the layers of argument 
they produce, and to delineate for us a deep philosophical problem. Let me now say a 
little bit about why they seem to me to rest on deeply mistaken foundations. In brief, 
it seems to me that Wittgenstein’s problem of identification flows from a model of 
representation and identification which is too narrow. The solipsistic claims which 
follow from the supposition of that model therefore seem to me to be avoidable.  To 
do justice to Wittgenstein the claim of avoidability should come only after a detailed 
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unpicking of much of the argumentation of the Tractatus. Without such work we 
cannot be sure that the model of representation which appears as a problematic 
presupposition of Wittgenstein’s position on the self is not implied by unavoidable 
commitments that are more fundamental. I am not however going to do that work 
here. I will therefore attempt only to bring out the peculiarities of the model being 
used, and show the way in which it is related to Wittgenstein’s position on the self, 
leaving aside the question of whether it is ultimately unavoidable. 
 
IV. Representation without Observation and the Possibility of A Priori Contents 
It is obvious to any reader of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein thinks that there is an 
analogy between perception and representation. I have no doubt that it is in many 
cases an illuminating analogy. However, it can also be a dangerous analogy. It is 
inevitable that much will be excluded from our world if we think that everything in 
our world is known to us on the model of observation. When we look back on the four 
arguments presented above we find, I think, that all the arguments more or less 
explicitly assume that an observational model gives us an understanding of the basis 
of representation.  
 I take it that the role of this assumption in the argument from observability is 
transparent. The fact that it plays a role in what I called the argument from externality 
is also fairly clear. Indeed, it was suggested that we see the argument from externality 
as an argument from analogy, at least in so far as it is an independent argument and 
not the drawing together of conclusions from other arguments. The conclusion that 
the source or point of view of understanding of a representational system cannot be 
represented in that system follows very quickly if you argue with an observational 
model in mind. Otherwise it is by no means obvious. And if the argument is not an 
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analogical one based on the model of observation it is quite hard to see what 
argument it is.  
 Now what of the argument from psychological ascriptions? The move in that 
argument which seemed to decisively exclude the self from the world was the move 
that claimed that a self in the world, since it would have to be complex in order to 
represent the world, could not represent itself. As such it could not be the unified first 
person view point required for understanding or representation at all. It was suggested 
that Wittgenstein’s reasons for thinking that a complex self could not represent itself 
are brought out by attending to the model of representation he presents us with in 
5.5423 where he talks about what is required in order to perceive a complex. If 
representing a complex requires that we have some acquaintance with its simple 
constituents which we then take to be related to one another in such and such a way – 
in the way in which perceiving a complex requires that we perceive that its 
constituents are related to one another in such and such a way – self representation by 
a complex self looks impossible. So again a perceptual model seems to be a intrinsic 
part of the argument. 
 The argument from contingency is in many ways the strongest of the 
arguments that I have found in Wittgenstein at least in so far as it appears to rest only 
on an assumption of the contingency of the deliverances of experience. In fact, 
however, the rationale behind the connection between contingency and the denial of a 
prioricity seems to rest on the thought that everything known to us via experience has 
to be known in the way we know things though perception or observation. Perception 
is constituted in part by there being a contingent connection between perceiver and 
the object perceived. If we have a genuine case of perception it always possible that 
the object which is perceived need not have been perceived. Thus if what we perceive 
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is contingent then, given that our connection to what we perceive is also contingent, 
we can conclude that everything we perceive could be perceived as being other than it 
is.14 Wittgenstein, I suggest, generalizes this argument to everything that can be 
known through experience. This generalization seems to be illegitimate. The first 
thought is that it simply does not seem right to say that there could not be a priori 
parts of our experience that were also contingent. 
 Perhaps the clearest way to bring this out is to note that we need to distinguish 
the modal status of the content delivered by an experience from the possibility of 
grasping that content as true or false. If we make this distinction we can come to see 
how, despite its contingency, the conditions under which a subject grasps content can 
be such that it is possible for the subject to grasp such a content only if it is true. This 
means that we can allow contents which if grasped seem to be known a priori to be 
true even though they are contingent. For example, I need not take my existence to be 
necessary in order to accept it as in a sense a priori true that ‘I exist’ whenever I think 
it.15 Similarly my inability to utter falsely ‘Now I am speaking’ in no way undermines 
my freedom to utter nothing at all at this time. More generally, when I anticipate 
experiencing the world, that I will be around doing the experiencing is assumed a 
priori. It does not follow from this that any part of my experience is not contingent. 
We would be tempted to overlook the possibility of aspects of what we experience 
being in this way a priori but contingent, if we assumed not only that what is 
experienced is contingent, but also that the connection between the content of the 
experience and its being experienced must always be contingent. If however part of 
the content of an experience can depend upon the fact of its being experienced, then 
that cannot be a warranted assumption. Now we have supposed that the objects that 
we perceive – see, hear, smell etc. – are always contingently connected with the 
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perceiving subject. If we were to assume that the only way for a subject to know itself 
through experience would be for it to perceive itself, then we would be entitled to 
conclude that knowledge of the subject through experience would contradict the 
contingency of what is experienced. The suggestion is that this line of thought that is 
present in the argument from contingency.16 It is on these grounds that I claim that 
that argument for the non-representability of the self also relies on a perceptual model 
of representation.17  
 I hope the above has established at least that a perceptual model of 
representation is playing a significant role in all the arguments against the possibility 
of self-representation. In so far as Wittgenstein is essentially operating with a 
restriction that is avoidable, we can see solipsism as avoidable. The restriction is, I 
think, mistaken but I am not going to argue for that view here. Of course, to many 
ears, the argument that the restriction results in solipsistic claims, would count in 
itself as an argument by reductio against the restriction. I will rest with suggestion 
that there is a dependency. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
I want, before finishing, to highlight two remarks that have already been quoted 
which it seems to me can be taken as suggestions as to how the subject might come to 
know and represent itself as an object in the world. They indicate lines of thought that 
Wittgenstein himself is precluded, by his restrictive model of representation, from 
taking as anything more than illuminations of his view of the subject as liminal. We 
have already looked at the first of the two remarks I have in mind. It is that remark on 
the experience of logic that occurs in the sections following the discussion of 
psychological reports: 
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5.552 The ‘experience’ that we need in order to understand logic is not that 
something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, 
however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience – that something is so. 
As we suggested above, the naive thought here is: why is the ‘experience’ that 
something ‘is’, not also an experience. Not indeed an experience that such and such is 
the case, but an experience or aspect of experience nevertheless. If we can exploit this 
aspect of experience in order to extract the possibility of self-representation from the 
fact of experience itself we might find a way to avoid the solipsistic conclusion. 
 The second suggestive remark Wittgenstein makes comes in his account of 
what I can describe in the world: 
5.631 ...If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to 
include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were 
subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc. 
In describing the world as I found it I would be able to include that which obeys my 
will and include the fact that it obeys my will. But how do I know which ‘parts are 
subordinate to my will’ and which are not? In this remark we have presented the 
possibility that we experience parts of the world in a very particular way – namely we 
experience them as direct respondents to our will. But if that is so we might have a 
way of placing ourselves back in the world. For one thing, if we do experience parts 
of the world as responding to our wills, it is clear that experience is not just of the 
facts, does not just deliver to us that things are thus and so. In experiencing my arm 
moving when it moves as a result of my will I experience my arm as mine – I 
experience it as my arm moving. When however I experience my arm moving when it 
just moves it seems I need not experience it as mine.18
 Let me finish by presenting some remarks from Merleau-Ponty by way of 
trying to express a warning about how easy it is to fall into making the move that 
results from Wittgenstein’s exclusion of the subject from the world. Merleau-Ponty 
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might be thought to provide for us a perfect antidote to Wittgensteinian solipsism. 
Indeed we could see him as the philosopher who inspires the suggestion made above 
that we look to bodily action as a way of finding our way back into the world. For 
Merleau-Ponty, in contrast to the early Wittgenstein, presents us with a thoroughly 
situated self. Yet it is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty seems to be drawn to a 
view regarding the body very similar to that we have ascribed to Wittgenstein 
regarding the self.  
I am accessible to factual situations only if my nature is such that there are 
factual situations for me. In other words, I observe external objects with my 
body, I handle them, examine them, walk around them, but my body itself is a 
thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the 
use of a second body which itself would be unobservable. (1962, p. 91). 
 
Here we have the unobservability of the body noted, and explained by its being a 
precondition of observation. Further he says: 
In so far as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be neither seen 
nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being ‘completely 
constituted’ is that it is that by which there are objects. (1962, p. 92). 
 
The body therefore is not one more among external objects, with the 
peculiarity of always being there. (1962, p. 92). 
 
Thus the permanence of one’s own body, if only classical psychology had 
analysed it, might have led it to the body no longer conceived as an object of 
the world, but as our means of communication with it. (1962, p. 92). 
 
In these comments we find expressed the temptation to deny the body its worldly 
status given that it is the means by which we come to observe a world at all. But it 
would be an error to give in to the temptation – to think of the body as in some way 
transcendental or as non-representable. And perhaps it is also clearer why we must 
rather explore whether we do not represent and know our bodies through an 
experience of them which is unlike our experience of other objects. Perhaps, for 
example, we can make something of the thought that we experience our bodies 
 25
through experiencing the world – through handling things, examining them and 
walking around them. I suggest that in the same way we also resist the similar 
temptation with regard to the representing subject. 
 Merleau-Ponty somewhat mysteriously pronounces in the same chapter: ‘If I 
did not take my clothes off I would never see the inside of them.’(1962, p. 91). 
Fortunately, given that it would seem to be a mistake to think that we must always see 
to know, even the least frequent bather is not thereby destined not to know that their 
clothes have an inside.19
 
Lucy F. O’Brien 
University College London 
                                                          
1 See David Pears (1987) and (1996). 
2 The quoted remarks from the Tractatus, in the following argument, are those which 
seem to me to express or explain the claim in italics under which they appear. 
3 There is obviously a question as to what, or whether, there is a difference between 
the claim that the subject is the limit of the world and the claim that it is identical with 
the world. This is, however, not a question I will go into here. 
4 Brewer (1992) suggests that the non-encounterability of the self (one of the 
arguments discussed below), plus a sense-based idealism, is what results in 
Wittgensteinian solipsism. I am unhappy with this partly because it ignores other 
arguments for the non-representability of the self, but also because it seems to assume 
that the assumption of the representability of reality is based on sense-based idealism, 
but as I suggest, it need not be. 
5 This feature of certain kinds of ‘ultra realism’ is brought out in Sacks (1994). The 
paper argues that McGinn’s arguments for his view that we could not ever come to 
understand the relation between mind and body are of a kind which commit him to 
necessities that are in tension with his naturalism. 
6 For an early, and very clear, statement of this example see James (1983, p.162). 
James refers, when giving the example, to a related one from Brentano. 
7 This is of course to take Wittgenstein as being very Kantian. I am happy with this – 
his commitment to there being a subject of experience that stands as the focal point of 
all representation and understanding is very likely inherited, directly or indirectly, 
from Kant. 
8 The discussion here picks up on only one element of what is wrong with this 
drawing of the visual field. As Sullivan (1996) brings out, what is really wrong with 
this drawing is that it is a drawing at all. 
9 We can imagine a similar argument for the claim that space and time are not known 
through experience. If a space time structure is taken to be a condition of everything 
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that can be experienced, then it might be claimed to have an a priori status in relation 
to what is experienced that contradicts the possibility of its being known through 
experience. Any such a priori status will certainly contradict the possibility of its 
being known through experience, if we hold that everything we experience could be 
experienced as otherwise. 
10 Notice that the account given of the import of 5.634 makes it apply equally to the 
different accounts of self-identification suggested by Russell – to the suggestion both 
that the self is known and identified through acquaintance and that it is known via 
description. In this I disagree with Pears (1987, pp. 182-4) who takes this remark as 
providing a critique just of the description theory. It seems to me rather to connect 
directly with why the self cannot be identified or noted as part of the world taking the 
possibility of descriptive identification as a special case. The other special case being 
identification through acquaintance or some such. 
11 As will emerge, it seems to me that the thinking behind the argument from 
externality understood as an argument from analogy in this way plays a role also in 
the other three arguments identified.  
12 The thought that it is an important aspect of Wittgenstein’s discussion that he sees 
the futility of postulating a subjective world or realm in order to explain the place of 
subjectivity is brought out particularly clearly in Bell (1996). 
13 We obviously have goods reasons for being optimistic about gaining elucidation of 
Wittgenstein’s conclusions on the self from his remarks on logic. Both are considered 
to be systematically elusive with respect to expression and representation, an 
elusiveness arising from a shared presuppositional status in relation to the world 
itself. Both are taken to pervade the world by constituting its limits. 
14 Note that if anything that can be known by inference is inferred from what is 
known through experience, and if what is known through perceptual experience is 
contingently related to the subject then that known through inference will also be. 
15 Kaplan (1989) notes this feature of indexical utterances and urges a distinction 
between a context of use and a circumstance of evaluation. Although he is talking 
only about utterances the idea that we need to distinguish between conditions under 
which a content is true or false from the conditions under which it can be grasped as 
true or false is the same. Also see the discussion of the cogito in Williams (1978, 
p.74). 
16 Sullivan (1996) gives a reading of Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism that takes 
it to be based at least in part on a concern to avoid (Kantian) idealism. A rejection by 
Wittgenstein of a substantial a priori is argued to be a central element of that concern. 
If that is right, and the reading is fascinating and plausible, the rejection of a 
substantial a priori by Wittgenstein has deeper roots than has been brought out here. 
17 It is perhaps evidence in favour of looking at Wittgenstein in this way that 
Anscombe, and other Wittgensteinians, seem to hold that we do not identify or refer 
to ourselves using ‘I’ precisely because they can given no account of the way in 
which we are presented with ourselves that would explain such reference. I think their 
mistake is to adopt an observational model of identification – such a model seems 
bound to fail us in regard to the first person. 
18 See O’Brien (1995). 
19 This paper was written for a conference on Solipsism held in Rethymnon, Crete 
funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and organized by David Bell, Maria Vanieri 
and Willi Vossenkuhl. My thanks to them and to other participants, for comments and 
for the considerable amount I learnt from their papers. Thanks also to an anonymous 
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referee for this journal. Particular mention is owed to David Bell, Adrian Moore, 
Mark Sacks and Peter Sullivan for discussion and comments at various stages. 
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